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What does an equal sacrifice tax look like in the case of a rank-dependent 
social welfare function? One's tax liability evidently becomes a function of 
one's income and one's position in the distribution in such a case, but not 
much else appears to be known. (Menahem Yaari touched upon the issue in 
his paper "A controversial proposal concerning inequality measurement", 
Journal of Economic Theory 1988, but focused only on a poll tax). In this 
paper, we determine the properties of  the equal sacrifice tax for a wide class 
of rank-dependent social welfare functions, and integrate the theory with that 
already available for the class of utilitarian social welfare functions. In an 
additional step, we analyze the equal sacrifice tax for a class of mixed 
utilitarian and rank-dependent social welfare functions, and finally we review 
what this synthesis has achieved. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  The equal sacrifice principle in its most common form, that of equal absolute 
sacrifice, states that everyone should give up the same amount of utility when paying 
income taxes. When applying this principle, economists tend to assume either that 
everyone has the same utility function or that there is a benevolent social planner, whose 
welfare function is used when calculating the sacrifices to be made by taxpayers. 
 
  One function of this paper is to review the literature that has grown up around the 
equal sacrifice principle, which is quite an old principle.
1 This literature mostly uses a 
utilitarian framework of analysis – necessarily so, one might think, since a utility of 
income function is the essence of the approach. However, notwithstanding this, Young 
(1988) has shown that the equal sacrifice principle can be justified on the basis of non-
utilitarian concepts of distributive justice, and Yaari (1988) has shown that the principle 
can also be articulated in terms of a rank-dependent (linear) social welfare function.  
                                                 
1  This principle was developed from the first of Adam Smith’s (1776) four “canons of taxation” (that 
taxation should be equitable) by, inter alia, Mill (1848), Carver (1895), Edgeworth (1925) and Pigou 
(1932).   
 